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Chapter 4 





According to the existing scholarship, cameralists were generally in favour of a closed 
protectionist state. This was often conceptualised with reference either to Spartan or Chinese 
virtues. This so-called “philosophical way” or “isolated way”, so they argued, would lead the 
German states into long-lasting happiness. However, closer scrutiny of the thoughts of late 
cameralists, particularly Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi, reveals a counter approach to 
international order and trade that challenges current understandings of a cameralist penchant for 
autarky. This chapter argues that Justi did not consider an exit from interstate competition 
feasible for Prussia nor for any European state. The “philosophical way” had become impossible 
in Europe because of the depth of ties created by interstate trade. Justi instead contended that the 
only way for European states to go was that of the “man of the world”. The chapter reveals that 
Justi, often heralded as late cameralism’s greatest theoretician, in fact suggested the emulation of 
British practices of international trade by Prussia. The principle advocate of “cameral sciences”, 
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According to the existing scholarship, cameralists were generally in favour of a closed, 
protectionist state. Margaret Schabas recently argued that cameralism “focused on domestic trade 
and consumption, promoted population growth, but with a strong inclination toward autarky or 
economic self-sufficiency”.1 Ernst Ludwig Carl’s Traites de la Richesse (1722–1723) is 
considered to be an exception, since it presented views in favour of global trade. The most recent 
volume on cameralism suggests that German cameralism was little interested in foreign markets 
and export trading.2 But is it really true that the political economy (Staatswirtschaft) of Prussia 
favoured a protectionist state with a closed domestic economy? The most recent findings 
demonstrate that Friedrich the Great aspired to position Prussia as an internationally trading 
nation capable of participating in the world of overseas commerce. Florian Schui dubbed the 
creation of the Prussian Asiatic Trade Company during the 1750s as Prussia’s “Trans-Oceanic 
Moment”.3 In concluding a commercial treaty with France called the Convention préliminaire de 
commerce (1753), Prussia sought to establish itself as a trading nation on the same level as the 
Low Countries and the Hanseatic cities. The change in Prussia’s economic and strategic 
orientation was apparent in the expansion of its trade routes and the opening of the free port of 
Emden.4  
 
All these initiatives were aimed at extensive involvement in overseas commerce. This change of 
commercial policy occurred around the 1750s and was supported by a royal campaign in which 
administrators, philosophers, merchants and diplomats participated; its theoretical culmination 
was represented by the writings of Prussian cameralists.5 This chapter will demonstrate how 
leading cameralist Johann Heinrich Gottlob von Justi (1717–1771) participated in this campaign 
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through his own writings. I argue that in the 1750s and 1760s, Justi favoured the primacy of 
international trade. This can be seen in his more theoretical considerations as well as in the 
proposals he made for practical implementation. The principal advocate of what has been widely 
considered to be a landlocked discipline was in fact deeply embedded in a transnational world. 
 
It is possible to explain why cameralism has not been prominent in the history of political 
economy. This has to do with shifts in political, economic and intellectual history. Cameralism 
was long considered a cornerstone of Friedrich’s Machtpolitik, itself a nineteenth-century 
category. Recent research has recognised that, rather than impose themselves on later categories, 
contemporary concepts, such as balance of power, jealousy of trade and universal monarchy, are 
helpful tools in an analysis of the complex political and economic configurations of the 
eighteenth century.6 In adopting this approach, I am building on the work of Istvan Hont and 
Ulrich Adam.7 The contemporary concepts used to analyse international relations are often 
metaphorical.  
 
However, the contemporary metaphors examined here are not those mentioned above. Justi 
vehemently rejected the concepts of universal monarchy and balance of power on the grounds 
that they were chimeras.8 The metaphors that he used were the man of the world (ein Weltman, 
Gallant Man), or the philosopher (Philosoph). He used these antithetically. The philosopher 
referred to a state that focused on the development of a closed domestic economy. The man of 
the world was a metaphor for a trading nation. Like so many of his contemporaries, Justi 
employed domestic analogies.9 According to Justi, states related to each other in the same way 
that human beings had in the state of nature. The goals of individual human beings and that of 
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states were the same: self-preservation and, ultimately, happiness.10 A human being could decide 
to seek his happiness in isolation. This was the image of the stoic philosopher meditating in 
solitude. These people were antisocial, living as if there were no one else in the world. The other 
option for human beings was to be social and enter into commerce and trade with other people: 
this involved social exchanges. Applying these metaphors to the international order, Justi argued 
that states could make the same choice. The metaphors in question implied that comparisons 
were made, and Justi’s comparative method was by no means limited to Europe. He made global, 
inter-societal comparisons.11 In the eighteenth century, the idea of the state as a solitary man was 
directly associated with Sparta, which was thought to have had a strict system of civil education 
and a culture of patriotism. The alternative to this was represented by Athens, which was 
characterised by cultural refinement, personal liberty and affluence. In Justi’s time, China was an 
example of a philosopher state, whereas England came closest to the idea of the man of the 
world, or the gallant man. 
 
Justi has often been interpreted along the lines of Schabas, and isolation has been taken to 
represent the primacy of domestic trade, frugality, autarchy and self-sufficiency. It has been 
thought that Justi’s Vergleichungen der Europäischen mit den Asiatischen und anderen 
vermeintlich Barbarischen Regierungen (1762) represents such a line of thinking. Following the 
example of China, Justi presented a “philosophical” or “isolated way” that would lead German 
states and Prussia, in particular, to long-lasting happiness.12 However, closer examination of 
Justi’s writings reveals that he did in fact favour the other conception of international order and 
trade. He did not consider it feasible for Prussia or any other European state to abandon the 
competition between European countries. The path of isolation was impossible in Europe 
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because of the existing ties created by trade between European states. According to Justi, the 
German states had no other option than to choose the way of a man of the world. This becomes 
particularly clear in Justi’s works on political theory.13 In these books, Justi argued that 
Germany, and Prussia, in particular, should emulate the way of international trade as advocated 
by Athens and England. A close study of Justi’s metaphors and their location in the broader 
European framework of political economy will help us better understand his vision for Prussia. 
 
2. Non-Commercial Nations 
 
Broader questions posed by rising commercialism were at the forefront of the Enlightenment 
discussion. Charles Rollin’s (1661–1741) Traite des etudes (1726–1728) and Histoire ancienne 
(1730–1738), together with Montesquieu’s (1689–1777) De l’esprit des lois (1748), brought 
Sparta into the discussion. Rollin fostered ardent admiration for the purity of the laws introduced 
by Lycurgus, a sentiment that became dominant and can also be detected in Justi’s writings. 
Rollin praised the wise legislator for abolishing economic equality, effected through the banning 
of money. Montesquieu associated Sparta with ardent patriotism and the love of equality.14 He 
saw Sparta as the antithesis of Athens: 
 
In Greece there were two sorts of republics; some were military, like Sparta; others were 
commercial, like Athens. In the former citizens were required to be idle; in the latter, 
efforts were made to inspire a love of work.15 
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According to Montesquieu, the success of the type of military state that Sparta represented 
depended on the absence of luxury. 
 
When Justi treated Athens as an example of a man of the world, he was commenting on the 
juxtaposition between Athens and Sparta in European political thought. Voltaire and others had 
compared Friedrich Wilhelm’s militaristic state with Sparta; the aspiration was for Friedrich II to 
convert Prussia as Sparta into a brilliant Athens.16 This was a metaphorical way of expressing 
what Friedrich II sought to effect through a change in economic policy. Prussia was to become a 
trading nation, a new Athens. Many eighteenth-century German and Prussian writers were 
sharply critical of Rousseau’s positive views of Sparta. The vast majority of German writers 
seemed to prefer Solon of Athens and praised Lycurgus, the great legislator of Sparta, much less. 
Christian Gotlob Heyne (1729–1812), a Göttingen classical scholar and philologist, and Johann 
Kaspar Friedrich Manso (1760–1826), a historian and philologist in Breslau, were exceptions to 
this rule because of their decisively Spartophilic views.17 
 
Justi praised Lycurgus as the wisest legislator of antiquity (des Alterthums),18 joining an 
increasing number of writers who referred to Sparta in mid eighteenth-century political 
treatises.19 Justi raised the case of Sparta when discussing the possibility of an isolated state and 
the potentially corrupting impact of commerce and luxury. In an autobiographical note in 
Fortgesetzte Bemühungen (1760), he reflected on his early views of the ways states could 
achieve happiness. His conception of how the happiness of a state could be promoted changed 
over the course of the 1750s. In his note, he wrote that even eight or 10 years previously, he 
would have shared Bielfeld’s critique of Lycurgus and his advocacy of isolation, as Bielfeld had 
Ch. 4, Nokkala, Justi on International Trade 140 
argued in his Institutions Politiques that isolation could not lead to happiness. However, Justi 
remarked that once he had extended his knowledge of the sciences of state, he came to regret the 
critique he had presented of Lycurgus. After study of the aforementioned sciences, he had come 
to realise that there were two equally good routes to happiness: the path of isolation and the path 
of exchange.20 
 
My view is that Justi’s re-evaluation of Lycurgus drew heavily on Rousseau. At the time Justi 
was writing, the best-known Spartophile was beyond a doubt Rousseau, although it is a matter of 
debate how far Rousseau really admired Sparta. Rousseau praised Spartan laws for the support 
they gave to a common spirit and military discipline. Equally, he admired the Spartan 
repudiation of commerce and luxury goods.21 He elaborated on Sparta in his Discourse sur les 
sciences et les arts (1750), although such references are surprisingly rare in his Discourse sur 
l’inégalité. He too treated antithetically the wisdom of Sparta and the politesse of Athens.22 We 
know that Justi was familiar with these works by Montesquieu and Rousseau,23 and he examined 
the antithesis between Sparta and Athens in the same spirit as they. 
 
In Vergleichungen (1762), Justi stated that although he was not a supporter of Rousseau, he 
shared Rousseau’s concern about the effects of luxuriousness (Ueppigkeit). According to Justi, 
Rousseau was right to argue that luxuriousness aroused self-interest and suffocated the love of 
the general good (Liebe zu dem gemeinschaftlichen Besten). This, in Justi’s view, would lead to 
despotism.24 He singled out money as the main source of greed, self-interest and luxuriousness; 
in sum, of all nefarious passions.25 Inspired by Lycurgus, who had outlawed money and 
commerce, Justi opposed money-based decadence and argued that in order to restrain passions 
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and desires in an isolated state, it was indeed necessary to prohibit money, since money was 
inevitably a dangerous encouragement of the passions. It was a sickness that eroded the love of 
the fatherland, respect for the general good and all other noble impulses. An example of the 
corrupting nature of money had manifested itself in Sparta once simple iron coins were replaced 
with silver and gold. Soon the heroic qualities of the Spartans were gone, and repulsive self-
interest took control.26  
 
Justi sought to draw moral and political lessons from the examples of antiquity. The path of 
isolation was a way of countering the financial greed and social antagonism associated with the 
growing importance of trade. The negative aspects of commercialism were increasingly 
recognised during the eighteenth century. The historical example of Sparta was used in various 
ways as an argument in debates on the corruptive nature of commerce. Sparta had banned luxury 
and currency and put the emphasis on simple and austere republican virtues. It exemplified the 
classical patriotism of the republics of antiquity in which agriculture and military skills were 
prioritised. Above all, in Sparta, the individual and self-interest were inferior to community and 
community interests. In Justi’s view, Sparta had stepped out from the competition that was 
quintessential for commercial nations. It was rather comparable to a philosopher and not a fellow 
enthusiast or competitor in the arena of international trade.27 China and Sparta had 
“philosophically” chosen to abstain from the jealousy of trade. As such, the path of isolation 
could be considered an interesting response to the jealousy of trade.28 Central aspects of the way 
of the philosopher were isolation and economic self-sufficiency. Justi argued that Japan was an 
example of a nation with flourishing manufactures even though it was not involved in foreign 
trade at all.29 China exemplified the virtues of a philosopher state; it was an unsocial nation with 
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outright protectionist policies. Justi emphasised that being an unsocial nation was not a violation 
of any code of conduct. The reason why states were not forced or expected to act socially lay in 
the fact that unlike individual human beings, states did not suffer from weaknesses that would 
require them to be sociable.30 Justi was very clear in arguing that sociability was neither a natural 
law nor a law of nations. As an advocate of the notion of unsocial sociability, he emphasised that 
sociability only springs forth when one can recognise the benefits that mutual aid can bring.31 
Justi pointed out that for this very reason, it was wise for trading nations to act sociably. 
 
According to Justi, the choice of a right path for a nation was limited by the location of the 
nation in question. A nation without harbours could not become a maritime man of the world. 
Also, the intellect and customs of a nation played a role in the choice of the right path. For 
instance, it would be impossible for France to choose the protectionist way of a philosopher. 
Justi equated this with the chance of an opera singer or a comedian to become a Pietist. 32 The 
philosophical way, the path of isolation, was best suited to melancholic people. This explained 
Lycurgus’s success in Sparta. The Spartans did not become melancholic due to Lycurgus’s 
reforms; they had been melancholic already. 33 For a nation to be successful in the path of 
isolation, it had to be like a philosopher who recognised the triviality of all the things that the 
world seemed to appreciate so highly. Instead, the philosopher nation choosing the path of 
isolation preferred to withdraw into silence from the dangers of sociable life. Yet, the isolated 
path was more likely to provide a more durable happiness. 34 
 
Justi argued that the successful following of the path of isolation required the adoption of a set of 
principles. A philosopher state should concentrate on the perfection of itself and never seek to 
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dominate other states. Here is where the Sparta went wrong. Its attempt to dominate Greece was 
at odds with the path it had chosen and was therefore a misguided plan. Another important 
principle for a philosophical state was to keep religion, laws and morality in perfect harmony. 
This was a particularly difficult principle to follow in Justi’s contemporary Europe. Having laws, 
morality and religion in correspondence could hardly be achieved without isolation, and being 
truly isolated in Europe was hardly possible, as Justi argued.35 However, the necessity of keeping 
laws, morality and religion in correspondence in a philosophical state could be exemplified by 
several historical examples, as it had been recognised by many great lawgivers, including 
Confucius, Moses, Lycurgus and Plato. The crucial harmony between laws, morality and religion 
enabled a love of the fatherland that was impossible to achieve in any other way. An example of 
the depth of this love was given by the Jews, who continued to love their fatherland even though 
it did not even exist anymore. The correspondence and equality of the law, religion and morality 
enhanced the love of the fatherland in such a manner that the philosopher state could be 
exceptionally strong in its defence.  
 
However, Justi argued, to strengthen the defence even further, the isolated state should cherish 
and encourage a bellicose courage among its citizens. China gave Justi an example of an isolated 
state that had suffered from a lack of bellicose courage. This explains why this otherwise 
powerful state had been occupied so many times. Similar was the case of Pennsylvania. William 
Penn had otherwise been a great legislator, but neglecting the importance of bellicose courage 
diminished his otherwise remarkable achievements in reforming the laws and institutions of 
Pennsylvania. 36 In sum, Justi argued that an isolated state could preserve its peace only by 
cultivating courage, which in practice meant that an isolated state was a military state. Sparta had 
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certainly succeeded in this. Its weaknesses resided elsewhere. The self-sufficient economy of an 
isolated state could not have a foundation anywhere other than in its diligent and skilful citizens, 
but in Sparta it was not the citizens but the enslaved helots who had proven their diligence and 
skilfulness. The citizens of Sparta were living off the work of the helots, preventing the state 
from reaching the true strength and perfection of which it was capable. Condemning the 
treatment of helots, Justi repeated a common view among Enlightenment thinkers: Sparta’s 
treatment of the helots was a major embarrassment to Spartans.37 
 
3. Trading Nations 
 
Justi’s second path to happiness, which he regarded as the only one possible in his contemporary 
Europe, was that of exchange. Here, Justi followed in the footsteps of Montesquieu and 
Rousseau. Ultimately favouring the government of England, Montesquieu concluded that the 
Spartan model was not possible in the contemporary world.38 And as Haydn Mason has argued, 
“Sparta represents for Rousseau the most pure phenomenon of a way of life that once existed, 
but exists no longer.”39 As we will see, Justi came very close to these views. 
 
The Spartan way belonged to the ancient world, or at least not to modern Europe. Justi’s 
admiration of the path of the philosopher was in some sense nostalgic, not unlike that of 
Montesquieu and Rousseau. He was, in fact, very pessimistic regarding the possibility that any 
European nation might escape jealousy of trade. The philosophical path was impossible because 
of the “unnatural” borders between European states, which made the defence of nations 
considerably more difficult. A second obstacle was posed by existing ties that formed a common 
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bond (als ein gemeinschaftliches Band). Justi concluded that the isolation of one European nation 
from all trade was almost impossible. Wealth and goods were divided unequally between 
different lands; every nation had its own special products. Therefore, the happiness of European 
states depended on foreign trade.40 European states were doomed to choose the path of a gallant 
man (eines galanten Mannes41) or of a man of the world (der Weg eines Weltmannes)42 who 
participated in competition and wished to enter the global arena (Schauplatz der Welt). They 
chose the path of trade. 
 
Justi regarded the levels of easiness and security as the main differences between the way of the 
man of the world and that of the philosopher. Both ways were equally justified, but one was 
easier and more secure than the other. Justi compared the difficult way of the man of the world to 
a secretary who wished to gain the position of minister. Perhaps only one out of a thousand 
secretaries was able to attain that goal. Justi also used very vivid language to describe the threats 
to the path of exchange. Considering the fate of a vehicle and its passengers on the path of 
exchange, he conceded that the journey might for a time be enjoyable, but that a lack of skill and 
experience might result in the coach being driven into a swamp. A second coach was doomed to 
travel forever because the driver was constantly drunk and, tempted by amusements and 
pleasures, unwilling to leave the tavern. A third coach went nowhere because it had joined the 
company of troublemakers and every sort of brawler, and it needed time to recover from its 
wounds. Here again, luxury and vices, the natural consequences of wealth, might cause the man 
of the world to lose sight of his path. In sum, the path of a man of the world was extremely 
difficult.43 Central to Justi’s thinking and political and economic thought in general was the need 
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for a plan that would guide the man of the world. Justi was convinced that he had such a plan for 
Prussia, a point to which we will return below. 
 
The nations most suitable for this difficult journey were those with great maritime merchant 
fleets. Without such a fleet, successful commerce was almost impossible. Furthermore, Justi 
emphasised that for the path of exchange, well-cultivated and fertile land was a necessity. Only 
colonies with natural resources could partly or wholly replace this; and if so, care had to be taken 
that the colonies did not start manufacturing or trading on their own behalf. He thought that the 
Phoenicians and Greeks should have made their colonies dependent but failed to do so; this was 
the greatest error on the part of these two trading nations. The backbone of trading nations was 
their surplus (Überschuß) of products.44 
 
Although Justi praised Athens, eighteenth-century England was his prime example of a trading 
nation. England was the eighteenth-century state equivalent of the gallant man or the man of the 
world. In many ways, Justi was a committed anglophile: England had all the virtues necessary 
for a trading nation to achieve the greatest possible happiness. In England, citizens enjoyed 
freedom and security, which made them diligent. The freedom of citizens was guaranteed with a 
balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government.45 It is worth 
noting that Justi was not blind to the problems commercialism had caused in England, namely 
corruption and luxuriousness. However, he was eager to point out that freedom and corruption 
were intimately associated. Granting a high level of civil freedom to citizens was bound to lead 
to corruption. Furthermore, Justi argued that a trading nation could not outlaw money, and the 
drive for riches was considered a positive passion. In addition, he pointed out that while luxury 
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could destroy the virtues of a philosopher state, it was the driving force in a trading nation. 
However, he was also keen to point out that luxury should stem from national products. This 
would allow the trading nation to maximise the expansion of its own trade.46 The passion of an 
individual, that individual’s self-interest and the drive to achieve riches benefited the whole state 
and formed a part of a larger plan. Albert Hirschman argued that harnessing this passion was 
essential for the emergence of “capitalism”. The desire for riches could become an acceptable, 
predictable “interest”. It was a calm and calculated desire. Essential in this respect was the 
distinction between innocuous “interests” and harmful passions.47 Any reader might now be 
wondering how it was possible that Justi could simultaneously praise the outlawing of money in 
ancient Sparta. The only plausible explanation I can think of is that the Spartan case belonged to 
the ancient world, whereas his praise of the benefits of moneymaking related to then-modern 
trading nations. The return to ancient republican virtues was impossible in Europe. 
 
A nation that had chosen the path of isolation did not need to exhibit any kind of social 
behaviour. It lived as if it were alone in the world. The case was different for trading nations. 
Trading nations were poised to be sociable because it was in their interest to be so. Their 
sociability was commercial and in some ways could even be regarded as unsocial sociability. It 
was not sociability for sociability’s sake but rather for trade’s. However, Justi emphasised that 
the notion of sociability should not be understood too broadly in the case of the trading nation. A 
successful trading nation, just as a successful man of the world, did not hesitate to take advantage 
of fellow rivals. The trading nation had accepted the rules of competing once it had entered the 
competition between trading nations; it was social and open to fair competition; however, 
everyone would seek for their own benefit. Justi recognised that this might contradict some 
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common notions of sociability, but at the same time he argued that such an understanding of 
sociability was incompatible with living in the great human societies. For men of the world, as 
well as for trading nations, it was impossible to become rich, honourable or happy without using 
the weaknesses of others. This was not an injustice, since the trading nation expected the other 
nations to treat it similarly. It too had subscribed to the rules of competition once entering the 
world arena; adversaries would ruthlessly abuse its weaknesses for their benefit, and rightly so. 
The situation was even compatible with the famous golden rule: do unto others as you wish them 
to do to you. The only condition for using the weaknesses of other nations was that the trading 
nation may not be the source of the weakness of the other trading nation whose weakness it is 
using for its benefit.48 Still the big picture was clear: every nation prioritised its own interest 
before the others and expected them to do the same.49 
 
Justi recognised the problem that successful trading nation would be envied by the nations whose 
weaknesses it was exploiting, even if it would not be the original source of these weakness. It 
would inevitably encounter jealousy from a wide spectrum of nations, including its allies. 
Jealous nations, who were losing their share in international trade were most likely to cause 
armed conflicts. These comments of Justi can be seen in the context of the Seven Years’ War. 
England was envied by jealous nations, such as France, its major rival. Although England was a 
peace-loving nation, it was forced to go to war. Still, as a successful trading nation, it was well 
prepared to resist its enemies.50 
 
During the Seven Years’ War, French authors in particular accused England of trying to establish 
a universal maritime monarchy. Justi denied that this was England’s goal. At first glance, this is 
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in contrast with Justi’s conviction that a trading nation aimed at dominating trade as much as it 
could. However, there is no real contradiction to be found here. According to Justi, England did 
not aspire for a universal monarch. In fact, Justi argued that the most successful trading nation 
would not become a universal monarchy on whom other nations were dependent, but rather it 
would be slowly forced into isolation and down the solitary path of a philosopher. Justi used 
metaphorical parallels to reinforce his point and argued that although the two paths to happiness 
were different at the beginning, they both led to the same destination, which meant that at some 
point, the paths would converge. The man of the world had an adventurous journey to places 
such as gardens and taverns, but after facing all manner of dangers and troubles, he had to leave 
the vanities of the world behind and settle down in isolation. Alluding to stoic philosophy, Justi 
wrote that this was the right use of life according to wise men such as Cicero and Seneca: to 
enjoy the fruits of labour in solitude. Justi emphasised that the return of the man of the world to 
the path of a philosopher was conditioned by the fact that prosperity seemed to set limits on 
itself. In other words, there were natural limits to the success of trade. This explained why 
England did not and could not have aspired to establish a universal maritime monarchy.51 
 
In his conception of the natural limits of prosperity and the success of trade, Justi was building 
on ideas that were known from the works of Hume and Montesquieu. Montesquieu discussed the 
topic in his essay on universal monarchy, while Hume developed similar views in his “rich 
country-poor country thesis” related to what is known as the price-specie flow mechanism.52 The 
idea that trade balances could be self-correcting had already been accepted for some time before 
Hume elaborated on it. However, it was Hume who truly made this mechanism known to a wider 
public.53 Justi’s position shared similarities with the cyclical view of commercial progress that 
Ch. 4, Nokkala, Justi on International Trade 150 
Hume presented in Of the Balance of Trade (1752) and Of Money (1752). Hume argued that the 
“low price of labour in every nation which has not an extensive commerce, and does not much 
abound in gold and silver” compensates for the advantages in skills that successful commercial 
nations possess. Hence, “Manufactures, therefore gradually shift their places, leaving those 
countries and provinces which they have already enriched, and flying to others.”54 According to 
Hume, the abundance of money in a commercial state enabled poorer actors to undersell the rich 
in all foreign markets. Hume wrote in a letter to Lord Kames that “the growth of all bodies, 
artificial as well as natural, is stopped by internal laws, derived from their enormous size and 
greatness. Great empires, great cities, great commerce, all of them receive a check, not from 
accidental events, but by necessary principles.”55 Justi may have adopted Hume’s ideas on the 
cyclical nature of progress and decline, as they were found in preliminary form in Hume’s Of 
Refinement in the Arts (1742) and Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences (1742).56 
We know that Justi was at least familiar with these works. In addition, there is evidence that he 
knew Hume’s History of England.57 In the context of Prussia, the idea that backward nations 
could catch up to more progressed nations must have been attractive to Justi much in the way it 
helped Hume envision a more prosperous Scotland. 
 
Justi knew very well that in order for Prussia to be competitive in the international arena, internal 
reforms were necessary. It may even be argued that Justi’s whole oeuvre can be read as a 
response to how German states could succeed in international trade, a success that had become 
an imperative and set economic limits on politics.58 Turning Prussia into a trading nation 
required extensive economic, political and social reforms. England, the most successful trading 
nation, served as an example for Justi. The two main goals of Justi’s reform proposals were a 
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moderate government and civil liberty, as only countries with these two features could excel 
commercially. Cultivating the economic self-interest of citizens and their freedom to seek for 
their own happiness—predominantly understood in economic terms—was crucial for any trading 
nation. These factors were the best driving forces of economic vivacity. For Justi, England was 
an example of how the freedom of citizens was guaranteed by separating the legislative branch 
from the executive. In this way, they could keep each other within limits. Justi was too cautious 
to suggest a separation of powers in Prussia. Instead, he suggested other measures that would 
enhance the freedom of its citizens. It is clear that in Justi’s economic and political thought, 
nascent commercialism placed the validity of rank and privilege in question. He wanted to 
abolish agricultural labour, condemned the granting of feudal privileges and questioned the 
existence of hereditary judicial power.59 
 
Justi’s plans for Prussia were not limited to calls for inner reforms. According to him, Prussia 
needed a successful foreign policy that would turn it into a maritime trading nation. These 
theoretical and practical considerations can be interpreted as Justi’s direct support of Friedrich 
II’s campaign to turn Prussia into a trading nation. And he wasn’t doing this alone. Friedrich II’s 
foreign policy was supported by university professors, who were increasingly interested in the 
opportunities maritime trade offered. Exemplary here is Carl Friedrich Pauli’s The Interest of the 
Prussian States in Profitable Trade, especially Maritime Trade (Die Vortheile derer 
Preussischen Staaten zum einträglichen Handel, sonderlich zur See).60 Unlike many of his 
fellow German writers, Justi had own first-hand experiences from a state that was to a great 
extent involved in maritime trade. In 1757, Count Johann Hartwig Ernst Bernstorff (1712–1772) 
invited Justi to Copenhagen, where Justi consulted the Danish government and, according to 
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some sources, acted as customs director (Kolonial-Inspektor).61 Justi’s brief stay in Denmark in 
1758 inspired him to reflect on the benefits of neutrality as foreign policy for a trading nation 
with high ambitions. Count Bernstorff, Justi’s powerful mentor in Copenhagen, directed Danish 
foreign policy from 1751 to 1770. His first principle was to keep Denmark neutral in all 
conflicts. For a long time, Bernstorff’s ideology was idealised, and the principle of keeping 
Denmark out of wars was interpreted within an ethical framework, and, as a corollary, Bernstorff 
was characterised as a person of moral superiority. Later research has shown that Bernstorff was 
seeking to decisively advance Danish interests in shipping and commerce. Neutrality was a tool 
for a small state to keep out of conflicts, but even more so, it was a tool to become prosperous 
and increase its share of international trade, which could ideally be maintained in a future period 
of peace.62 It seems that Justi’s views came very close to those of his mentor. First, German 
lands had often been battlefields, and Justi perceived neutrality as a tool in preventing future 
wars on German soil. Second, neutrality would not only serve to avoid destructive wars but also 
to conquer larger portions of foreign trade and advance prosperity. Therefore, neutrality could be 
a policy to liberate Prussia from its economic and political backwardness.63 It could also help 
Prussia to stabilise its recently gained status as a great power among European nations.64 
 
Justi’s most extensive treatment of neutral trade is to be found in his pamphlet on the chimera of 
the balance of trade (Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt, 1759), 
which was written as a reaction to the pro-French pamphleteers who blamed England and its ally 
Prussia for disturbing the balance of trade. The pamphlet was written in the context of the Seven 
Years’ War. In particular, Justi criticised Jean-Henri Maubert de Gouvest (1721–1767), whom he 
considered to be the author of Politique Danois (1756), for mischievous scheming and for trying 
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to win Denmark’s support of France and its allies against England, who, according to Maubert, 
was striving to become a dominating “universal monarch of the seas”. In Justi’s view, this could 
not have been further from the truth. If Denmark was to become belligerent, it should join 
Prussia and England for its own benefit. However, Justi did not insist on this point. Rather, he 
recognised the prudence of Denmark’s neutral foreign policy. Unlike other countries that envied 
the success of England, Denmark wisely concentrated on developing its own economy and trade. 
Justi regarded Denmark’s forward-looking policy as wise in another sense, as well: Denmark 
was not obsessed with trying to re-conquer its former provinces (Scania, Halland and Bleking) 
from Sweden; rather its focus was on domestic reforms. Justi made this point to address the pro-
Austrian pamphleteers and that country’s wish to recover Silesia from Prussia. Austria would do 
better to concentrate on reforming its agriculture and commerce.65 
 
The last chapter of Justi’s Die Chimäre des Gleichgewichts der Handlung und Schiffahrt is an 
attack on the abusive nature of Dutch neutrality, which Justi did not consider as true neutrality.66 
The Dutch had compromised their impartial status by simply taking over trade from France’s 
colonies. In other words, Dutchmen were doing France’s trade for them by taking the position of 
the enemy. This contradicted Justi’s idea of neutrality as defined in terms of impartiality and not 
giving “preference to either of the two belligerents”.67 Taking the position of the enemy in the 
form of trading on their behalf was equal to other violations of impartiality, such as providing a 
fortress under siege with war supplies. Therefore, according to Justi, Dutchmen could not be 
considered neutral in the Seven Years’ War. In their case neutrality was only a mask to conceal 
greedy political designs, and Justi wanted the Dutchmen to stop carrying the loads of the enemy. 
He advocated a view that later became known as the Rule of 1756. This rule stipulated that 
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neutrals in wartime should refrain from trade that had been close to them in the time of peace. 
The violation of this rule made them into belligerents.68 
 
The Danish neutrality that Justi wanted Prussia to emulate differed from the abusive neutrality of 
the Dutch. This kind of genuinely neutral trade was to be allowed in times of war. Under the 
direction of Bernstorff, Danish foreign policy had respected the principle of impartiality. Justi 
explicitly counted Bernstorff among the greatest statesmen alive. In particular, Justi admired the 
mechanism of Danish neutrality. He believed that in wars, the belligerents were seldom able to 
conquer new markets. However, when two powers were in a commercial war with each other, it 
was relatively easy for a neutral state to increase its share of trade. Justi was by no means the 
only German author to address this issue, and neither was his view widely accepted. For 
instance, an anonymous pamphleteer argued that although belligerents weakened each other in 
war, this did not always automatically increase the relative power of a neutral state.69 Justi’s 
position was different. He argued that when England and France were fighting during the Seven 
Years’ War, Denmark was the real winner thanks to its wise foreign policy.70 Justi knew enough 
to tell this from his own experiences. According to him, only one product, sugar, had provided 
Denmark with a “surplus” of 800,000 thalers. This gave support to the reliability of the general 
principle that during long commercial wars both belligerents lost some of their share in global 
trade to neutral parties. To give further evidence of his view, Justi used historical examples of 
how the mechanism of neutrality as a foreign policy worked. He argued that although the 
commercial war that Denmark and Sweden started against the Hanseatic League was just, its 
consequences were not desired by Denmark or Sweden. While the Hanseatic League lost part of 
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its share of trade, Sweden and Denmark did not benefit. Rather, Holland had stayed out of the 
conflict and became its true winner in terms of trade.71 
 
Justi’s rebuttal of bellicosity was strikingly unambiguous among his German compatriots.72 As 
already mentioned, he regarded Danish neutrality so highly because it allowed Denmark to avoid 
conflicts. In Justi’s view, not even the successful wars were economically sustainable. In 
Grundriss (1759), Justi argued that wars resulted into depopulation, caused currency disorders 
and forced the state into heavy taxation; taken together, these factors suffocated foreign 
commerce and any possibility of developing a manufacturing industry.73 He repeated this view in 
his war pamphlet Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge (1760), in which he made a proposal for how peace 
could be secured in Europe. According to Justi, it was unfortunate that belligerents were so sure 
they would improve the conditions of their countries through war, while investments in domestic 
reforms, commerce and manufacturing would be much wiser and greater “conquests”.74 In short, 
the way of a man of the world could not be one of bellicosity. In this same pamphlet, Justi 
recognised the further benefits of neutrality and neutral trade in particular. Therefore, Justi 
envisioned for Prussia a foreign policy of “fixed neutrality” (vestgesetzte Neutralität). Neutrality 
as a foreign policy would prevent Germany from repeatedly becoming a battlefield, a cycle that 
had ruined the German economy over the past 200 years. Justi’s plan for Germany’s new 
strategic foreign policy would enable the German territories to leave behind the wars that had 
been so harmful to their economies.75 Although Justi frequently referred to Germany in his 
pamphlet, it was clear to the readers of his pamphlet that he had written it with Prussia’s interest 
in mind. In Justi’s vision, Prussia would adopt fixed neutrality and concentrate on developing its 
foreign trade, which would allow it to catch up to France and England, whose rivalry was most 
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likely to spark new wars in the future. Justi’s Austrian critic was keen to point out that Prussia 
seemed to be an ungrateful ally to England. Despite all the subsidies England had provided, 
Prussia was ready to abandon it. For this Austrian commentator, it was clear that Justi’s 
Wohlgemeynte Vorschläge was a Prussian peace project that had to be debunked.76 This is yet 
further proof that Justi had written with Prussia in mind. Justi responded to his commentator by 




In this chapter, I have revisited the common notion that cameralism focused on domestic trade by 
showing that Justi, as a leading cameralist, in fact favoured turning Prussia into a trading nation. 
In line with Friedrich’s strategies and objectives, Justi’s vision included extensive reforms to 
Prussia’s domestic and foreign policies. This is in sharp contrast with the now out-dated 
interpretation of cameralists as simply interested in describing Prussia’s existing practices of 
domestic administration.78 The way Justi treated the contrast between Sparta and Athens reveals 
that his thinking was deeply embedded within European economic and political thought, and he 
came to conclusions very similar to those of Rousseau and Montesquieu. Modern society was 
commercial, and that was inescapable. The political economy of commercial states had 
transformed Europe to a point from which a return to ancient virtues was morally and politically 
impossible. Justi realised that Prussia was lagging behind, and it is against this background that 
his domestic reform proposals and vision for Prussian foreign policy are best understood. 
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Recent research has convincingly shown that cameralism was not only a Prussian or German 
economic and political administrative practice and discourse. It was European in character.79 The 
aim of this chapter has been to demonstrate that it was also not purely landlocked and focussed 
on a closed domestic economy. Justi’s work did not promote a closed princely state. He was very 
much a part of Friedrich II’s royal campaign to turn Prussia into a trading nation. Following the 
example of the Danes would have been beneficial to Prussia. England and France would 
continue to weaken each other, while Prussia would become more powerful. In particular, the 
relative power of Prussia would grow in this constellation because, according to Justi, who was 
following the footsteps of Montesquieu, Justi power was always relative. 80 Friedrich II never 
managed to turn Prussia from a Sparta into an Athens. By the end of the Seven Years’ War, he 
came to realise that Prussia was not suited to the path of the man of the world. Prussia was not 
able to protect its merchant vessels. In his 1768 political testament, Friedrich stated that grand 
commerce was not for Prussia; Prussia was a “puissance de terre ferme”.81 All the same, it is 
worth remembering that Friedrich and Justi did for a time entertain a distinct trading future for 
Prussia. 
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